

# *Intensional Verbs Revisited*

Friederike Moltmann (Paris)

For the semantics of transitive intensional verbs like 'need' or 'look for' it is revealing to look at the behavior of quantifiers like 'something' which can replace the intensional complement:

- (1) a. John needs a sweater.  
b. John needs something.

Besides the substitutional quantification theory (which I consider mistaken), there are essentially two sorts of theories of the semantics of such quantifiers: the abstract meaning theory and the nominalization theory. The former takes quantifiers like 'something' to range over abstract meanings, such as properties (Zimmermann) or quantifiers (Montague, my former self). The latter, a theory which I had explored in relation to predicative and clausal complements, would take 'something' in (1b) to range over entities the corresponding nominalization stands for, entities of the sort 'John's need' or 'the need for a sweater'. While the abstract meaning theory faces severe problems some of which have recently been discussed by Zimmermann, the nominalization theory faces apparent problems as well, with the acceptability of examples like those in (2):

- (2) a. Mary bought what she needed.  
b. John promised what Mary needs.

I argue that a more thorough investigation of the range of sentences of this sort shows so far unnoticed restrictions that in fact support the nominalization theory, as long as various grades of abstraction of entities are allowed, ranging from 'needs' to 'satisfaction types' of objects of greater or lesser generality. The account will also explain the peculiar monotonicity behavior of intensional verbs, discussed by Zimmermann, and moreover illuminate sentences like (3):

- (3) The sweater John needs must be blue.